Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree by Browne, Kingsley R.
Wayne State University
Law Faculty Research Publications Law School
1-1-1995
Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor
Sangree
Kingsley R. Browne
Wayne State University
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at DigitalCommons@WayneState. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law
Faculty Research Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@WayneState.
Recommended Citation
Browne, Kingsley R.. Workplace Censorship: A Response to Professor Sangree. 47 Rutgers L. Rev. 579, 594 (1995)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.wayne.edu/lawfrp/352
WORKPLACE CENSORSHIP: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSOR SANGREE
Kingsley R. Browne*
I. INTRODUCTION
Professor Suzanne Sangree is to be commended for her can-
did recognition that "prohibitions on hostile environments
constitute state regulation of the content of speech";1 yet she
underestimates the substantial First Amendment concerns
that this regulation raises.2 Under Title VII as currently inter-
preted, employers must "prevent... bigots from expressing
their opinions in a way that abuses or offends their co-work-
ers."3 Employers must prohibit employees from displaying
sexually suggestive materials, because those materials "may
communicate to male co-workers that it is acceptable to view
women in a predominantly sexual way." Even "[wiell-inten-
tioned compliments" may result in liability.' Responding to the
law, employers forbid off-color jokes, discipline employees for
sexist comments and foul language, and require attendance at
* Associate Professor, Wayne State University Law School. I would
like to thank Joseph Grano for helpful comments on a draft of this
article.
1. Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environ-
ment Sexual Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision in
Sight, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 461, 477 (1995).
2. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, Title VII as Censorship: Hostile-
Environment Harassment and the First Amendment, 52 OHIO STATE L.J.
481, 481 (1991) (examining "the extent to which the broad definition of
'hostile work environment' . . establishes a content-based--even view-
point-based-restriction of expression that is inconsistent [with the]
[F]irst [A]mendment").
3. Davis v. Monsanto Chem. Co., 858 F.2d 345, 350 (6th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1110 (1989).
4. Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1526
(M.D. Fla. 1991) (quoting Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and
the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1212
n.118 (1989)).
5. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
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diversity-training sessions in which employees learn to sanitize
their speech to avoid offending women and minorities.6 When
employers receive complaints of sexual harassment, they must
act on them knowing that good-faith attempts to deal with the
problem may later be deemed inadequate.7
II. THE HOSTILE-ENVIRONMENT STANDARD IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE
A fundamental principle of First Amendment jurisprudence
is that a law regulating speech must give reasonable notice of
what is prohibited: "[u]ncertain meanings inevitably lead citi-
zens to steer far wide of the unlawful zone."8 As speech re-
strictions go, the hostile-environment standard is uncommonly
vague, forbidding speech that creates "an environment that a
reasonable person would find hostile or abusive." As Justice
Scalia observed in his concurrence in Harris v. Forklift Sys-
tems, Inc., the standard lets "virtually unguided juries decide
whether sex-related conduct engaged in (or permitted by) an
employer is egregious enough to warrant an award of damag-
es.",0
Professor Sangree tells us that three elements of the hostile
environment cause of action eliminate vagueness concerns:
6. See, e.g., Effective Sexual Harassment Policies, AM. LAW., Oct.
1994, at 86 (describing sexual harassment training and policies of law
firms, which bar sexual jokes, leering, and visual displays of degrading
images or stereotypes); Kishore Jayabalan, Typecasting "Diversity";, Sensi-
tivity and Sense: My Problem with Workplace Stereotypes, WASH. POST,
Dec. 4, 1994, at C5; Penny Lunt, Sexual Harassment: Not Always Obvi-
ous, Always Dangerous, ABA BANKING J., June 1994, at 132 (quoting a
manager of employee relations programs at a major bank as telling em-
ployees, " 'If someone you respected were standing next to you-a parent,
a child, your clergyman-would they be offended by your behavior? If so,
then it is probably not appropriate.' ").
7. Intlekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 773, 778-80 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting
that the employer "must take some form of disciplinary action"; oral
warnings and counseling are adequate as a first step only if they are
"disciplinary" in nature).
8. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 109 (1972) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
9. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367, 370 (1993).
10. Id. at 372 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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(1) the requirement that the speech be "unwelcome"; (2) the
rule that the employer must ordinarily have actual or construc-
tive notice of the speech in order to be held liable; and (3) the
fact that the employer avoids liability by taking "prompt and
effective remedial action"" to end the harassment. 2 Con-
trary to Professor Sangree's view, these factors do nothing to
mitigate the vagueness of the standard.
The factors cited by Professor Sangree alert the employer
that it faces a decision whether or not to censor the speech of
its employees. They do nothing to guide the employer in mak-
ing the decision, unless the rule is that the employer must
censor all speech that women do not want to hear. Of course,
such a requirement might no longer suffer from vagueness, but
it would be fatally overbroad. However, if the employer's obli-
gation is to censor less than all unwelcome speech, Professor
Sangree does not tell us how the employer should respond to
the employee who complains that she heard something that
she would rather not have heard.
Professor Sangree apparently does not believe that an em-
ployer is obligated to censor all unwelcome speech, but her own
description of the requirements of the standard demonstrates
its fatal vagueness. She says that the degree of speech regula-
tion required by Title VII differs from workplace to
workplace." For example, whether a particular display of por-
nography in a workplace violates Title VII turns on such fac-
tors as the level of female employment at each level of the
work force, whether there is a history of harassment in that
particular workplace, and whether pornography had been used
in that workplace to harass women in the past.'4 Presumably,
a similarly ad hoc analysis would apply to sexist comments as
well, since Professor Sangree emphasizes that the inquiry in
each case is context-specific.
Like most defenders of workplace speech regulation, Profes-
sor Sangree dismisses free speech concerns because she views
the issue from a litigation perspective. She is apparently confi-
dent that out of the crucible of litigation the correct result will
11. Sangree, supra note 1, at 503.
12. Id. at 498-503.
13. See id. at 470 n.31.
14. Id.
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be reached.15 If the environment is sufficiently offensive, the
court will find the employer liable; if the environment is offen-
sive, but not "too offensive," there will be no finding of liability.
Thus, the First Amendment is safe. However, as discussed
below, even a justified faith in judges and juries would not
substantially reduce First Amendment concerns since employ-
ers must cope with this vague standard long before they go to
court. Moreover, one of the primary reasons for the First
Amendment is the concern that judges and juries will punish
the expression of unpopular ideas.
III. THE SYSTEM OF VICARIOUS EMPLOYER LIABILITY LEADS TO
OVERCENSORSHIP
If the only censorship occasioned by hostile-environment law
occurred in the courtroom, then faith in judges and juries
might lead one to forgive the vagueness of the standard. If
judges and juries "know it when they see it,"1" employers may
be somewhat insulated from inappropriate judgments of liabili-
ty. Yet most of the censorship occurs not in the courtroom
where the employer is held liable, but in the workplace where
the employer is attempting to avoid liability. Thus, the ques-
tion is whether employers have adequate prior notice of what
they should censor.
The "totality of the circumstances" standard makes it impos-
sible for an employer to know at the time whether it has an
obligation to censor speech. Judges and juries have the benefit
15. This same litigation perspective leads Professor Volokh to believe
that improper speech regulation could be avoided by requiring that the
offensive speech be consciously directed toward a particular person who
the speaker knows does not welcome it. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of
Speech and Workplace Harassment, 39 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1791, 1845-47
(1992). Although such a rule would reduce the number of plaintiffs who
prevail at trial, it would do little to decrease the pressure on employers
to censor their workers. Since a plaintiff may always argue that the
speaker intended to offend-for example, that pinups were posted for the
purpose of annoying the plaintiff or that an overheard joke was deliber-
ately spoken within earshot of the plaintiff-the employer has the same
incentive to censor that it would have in the absence of an intent re-
quirement.
16. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concur-
ring) (referring to his test for obscenity).
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of hindsight. They can examine the proof at trial, employ "a
context specific doctrine,"" and decide whether the cumula-
tive effect of the speech creates a hostile environment. The
employer, on the other hand, must make its judgment one
incident at a time, in ignorance of what the "totality of the
circumstances" might be at trial.
Imagine a particular kind of statement that is not egregious
enough to create a hostile environment if spoken once, but
would create liability if spoken ten times. 8 An employee
makes the statement once, and a female co-worker complains.
Would the rational employer tell the offending employee that
he can make the statement only eight more times or would the
employer tell the employee never to make the statement
again? In any ensuing litigation, the employer will be faced
with the totality of offensive statements by all its employees. It
cannot afford to let any offensive speech go uncensored.
Professor Sangree rejects the argument that employers are
driven to overcensor. 19 She argues that employers' concerns
about employee morale will prevent overcensorship and that
the persistence of harassment in the workplace demonstrates
that employers must be underregulating rather than
overregulating." Neither of these arguments is persuasive.
The notion that overregulation will be inhibited by employer
concerns about morale is at best naive. Employers are unlikely
to risk hundreds of thousands of dollars in liability out of ab-
stract concerns about employee morale. Anyone having passing
familiarity with the measures that employers are taking today
would realize that employers are more concerned about liabili-
ty than they are about morale.2'
17. Sangree, supra note 1, at 558.
18. The fact that the reader is probably wondering how one could
possibly quantify such an example underscores the unpredictability of the
standard. The difficulty of such assessment is exacerbated by the view
that "the work environment may exceed the sum of the individual epi-
sodes." Burns v. McGregor Elec. Indus., 955 F.2d 559, 564 (8th Cir.
1992) (quoting Robinson, 760 F. Supp. at 1524).
19. Sangree, supra note 1, at 551-54.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Ann Meyer, Getting to the Heart of Sexual Harassment:
Effective Employee Training to Reduce Sexual Harassment Complaints:
Training, 37 HR MAG., July 1992, at 82 ("Increasingly, companies
1995] 583
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The fact that harassment persists notwithstanding the law
does not mean that employers are not overcensoring, any more
than the fact that murders continue to be committed means
that laws against murder do not discourage murder. No matter
what efforts employers make, they are not going to be com-
pletely effective at preventing employees from offending each
other. Moreover, some employers may not care whether they
are violating the law. To measure the overcensorship effect of
the law, one should look not to the behavior of those who are
willing to violate the law but rather to the actions of those who
attempt to comply with it. Thus, the relevant question is how
well-counseled employers who wish to avoid liability behave,
or, put another way, what kind of advice lawyers give to help
their clients avoid a sexual harassment claim.22
To illuminate the way in which the standard operates to
cause overcensorship, consider the following example. An em-
ployer tells its lawyer that a female employee has complained
about a cartoon on a co-worker's desk. The cartoon is not ob-
scene or even sexual, but it makes fun of women, and the fe-
male employee is genuinely offended by it. The employer tells
the lawyer that he thinks that the cartoon is funny and that
the woman is overreacting. The lawyer recognizes that the
cartoon, standing alone, does not constitute actionable harass-
ment. Does the lawyer tell the employer to: (1) tell the woman
that the employer thinks the cartoon is funny and that she is
overreacting; (2) tell the woman that, even if the cartoon is
offensive to her and to women generally, her co-worker has a
throughout the nation are looking for ways to alleviate anything that
could be construed as sexual harassment.").
22. See Michelle Quinn, Sex Harassment Claims Increasing: Firms
Clamor to Protect Themselves from Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 8, 1994,
at DI (describing lawyers' advice to "admonish people when they tell
offensive jokes").
Professor Sangree argues in her reply that "fears that persons
might overreact to laws because of paranoia about litigation cannot pro-
vide a legitimate basis for striking the laws down." Suzanne Sangree, A
Reply to Professors Volokh and Browne, 47 RUTGERs L. REV. 595, 595
(1994). While she is certainly correct that psychotic responses to laws do
not render the laws invalid, if one is led to censorship because of a fear
induced by a vague and unpredictable standard, the law is subject to
invalidation under the vagueness doctrine.
584 [Vol.47:579
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First Amendment right to display it; or (3) tell the co-worker to
remove the offending cartoon? Because the cartoon may later
be relied upon in a hostile-environment suit-as may the
employer's reaction to the woman's complaints-it would be
the rare lawyer who would counsel the employer to allow the
cartoon to be displayed.'
IV. EQUALITY NEITHER TRUMPS NOR ENTAILS FREE SPEECH
Professor Sangree suggests that, at bottom, her disagree-
ment with Professor Volokh and me is a "philosophical" one; it
is a simple difference in our "values."4 We reach our conclu-
sions because we value the right of workers to engage in free
speech in the workplace more than the interest in "eradicating
sex discrimination from the workplace";25 she reaches her con-
clusions because she has different priorities. Who is to say who
is right and who is wrong if it is just a question of personal
preference?
If the debate over free speech in the workplace is just over
personal value judgments, we are wasting our time. The de-
bate might make lively conversation at a cocktail party, but it
does not belong in a law review, since the authors' personal
policy preferences are of little or no interest to readers. The
23. Thomas R. Haggard & Mason G. Alexander, Jr., Tips on Drafting
and Enforcing a Policy Against Sexual Harassment: Labor Relations,
INDUS. MGMT., Jan. 1994, at 2 (advising employers to adopt policies pro-
hibiting "explicit sexual propositions, suggestive comments, sexually ori-
ented kidding or teasing, practical jokes involving sex or excretory func-
tions, sexually-oriented jokes, comments and questions about sexual at-
tributes or activities, foul or obscene language or gestures, display of foul
or obscene pictures or printed material").
A broad definition of sexual harassment is also provided to employ-
ees directly. For example, BNA distributes a pamphlet called Preventing
Sexual Harassment: A Fact Sheet for Employees. This document, prepared
by an employment lawyer at a major law firm, advises employees that a
sexually hostile work environment can be created by, among other things,
"telling off-color jokes," "displaying sexually suggestive pictures," and
"using demeaning or inappropriate terms, such as 'Babe.' " BUREAU OF
NATIONAL AFFAIRS, PREVENTING SEXUAL HARASSMENT: A FACT SHEET FOR
EMPOYEES (1994) (on file with author).
24. Sangree, supra note 1, at 467.
25. Id
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reason that the debate belongs in a law review is that the
question is a legal one: whether the Constitution permits-not
whether Professor Sangree or I like-the kind of regulation
that we are discussing.
Professor Sangree's perspective demonstrates the cogency of
Justice Stewart's warning that as long as the First Amend-
ment is viewed "as no more than a set of 'values' to be bal-
anced against other 'values' that Amendment will remain in
grave jeopardy."2 Unfortunately, the First Amendment is sel-
dom viewed as a real constraint on policy choices. Instead,
proponents of policies restricting speech balance free speech
against their desired policy goals, and consistently the result is
that their policy goals either outweigh speech, or, coincidental-
ly, are coextensive with the First Amendment. Unfortunately,
it is rare for people to advocate standards for speech regulation
that differ from the standards they would favor if there were
no First Amendment.
I am willing to concede that some of the speech that I be-
lieve cannot be regulated constitutionally is harmful, just as I
am willing to concede that the world would be a better place
without it. Yet those favoring suppression of speech can always
make a credible showing of harm, since no one seeks to prohib-
it speech that he views as harmless or having substantial val-
ue. The essential function of the First Amendment is to pre-
vent us from declaring speech harmful or worthless even when
we believe we have good reason to do so; if the First Amend-
ment prevented only irrational censorship, it would hardly be
necessary. A genuine commitment to free speech requires the
acknowledgment that living with speech we dislike is a central,
and intended, cost of the First Amendment.27 Thus, we must
26. Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 402 (1973) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Professor Sangree illustrates the cogency of this concern when she
suggests that a court should simply decide whether it believes employee
speech or protection of female employees to be "more important." See
Sangree, supra note 22, at 598. Presumably, that is the more exact in-
quiry that a legislature would make if there were no First Amendment.
27. Professor Sangree asserts that speech regulation is justified under
the "captive audience" doctrine. However, that doctrine has never been
used to justify viewpoint-based restrictions on speech. See Browne, supra
note 2, at 516-20; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
586 [Vol.47:579
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endure advocacy of illegal conduct, Nazis marching in Skokie,
and being pestered in airports. We might reasonably believe
that the quality of our lives would be better without this ex-
pression, but the First Amendment prevents us from acting on
that belief by suppressing speech.
Professor Sangree moves from the argument that interests
in workplace equality outweigh free speech concerns to the
argument that "[pirohibiting such speech enhances First
Amendment free speech principles."' This apparent contra-
diction rests on the following chain of logic: (1) discrimination
laws foster equality; (2) equality is necessary for democracy; (3)
the First Amendment has "underlying democratic aims;"
(4) therefore, discrimination laws advance the First Amend-
ment; (5) offensive speech violates the discrimination laws; (6)
therefore, offensive speech undermines the First Amendment;
(7) as a result, "[p]rohibiting such speech enhances First
Amendment free speech principles."
Professor Sangree's reasoning is an example of what Isaiah
Berlin referred to as "the conviction that all the positive values
AL LAW § 12-19, at 950 n.24 (1988) (noting that "the concept of a 'cap-
tive audience' is dangerously encompassing, and the Court has properly
been reluctant to accept its implications whenever a regulation is not
content-neutral"). Moreover, application of the captive audience doctrine
to prohibit one worker from speaking to another would be a dramatic
extension of the doctrine and could provide the state with greater power
to regulate speech of people in their homes, where they are captives,
than it would have to regulate it on the street, where they are not.
Browne, supra note 2, at 519-20.
28. Sangree, supra note 1, at 481.
29. Throughout her article, Professor Sangree makes her case easier
by collapsing categories. For example, she asserts that speech regulation
is appropriate because the state interest in eradicating sex discrimination
is " 'very important,' if not compelling." Id. at 532. Whether or not that
is true, it is largely beside the point. Given that most sex discrimination
will still be unlawful even if offensive speech is not prohibited, the issue
is whether the state interest in prohibiting offensive speech is compelling.
Similarly, in attempting to buttress her claim that it is necessary to
censor speech, Professor Sangree quotes statistics indicating that sexual
harassment is pervasive. Id. at 554 n.458. In order for those statistics to
be persuasive, however, she would have to show that they reflect the
number of victims of sexual harassment who would go without a remedy
if they could not rely on otherwise protected speech to make out their
claims.
1995] 587
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in which men have believed must, in the end, be compatible,
and perhaps even entail one another." ° That conviction, ar-
gued Berlin:
more than any other, is responsible for the slaughter of indi-
viduals on the altars of the great historical ideals--justice or
progress or the happiness of future generations, or the sacred
mission or emancipation of a nation or race or class, or even
liberty itself, which demands the sacrifice of individuals for
the freedom of society."'
When values are acknowledged to be pluralistic, the extent
to which any individual value will be pursued is limited, since
pursuit of one value produces costs in other values. For exam-
ple, if one acknowledges that liberty and equality may con-
flict,32 then one must acknowledge that pursuit of equality
may produce costs in liberty. When all positive values are
viewed as entailing one another, however, every step toward
one value is a step toward all others, leaving little reason to
limit pursuit of the favored value. If one believes that equality
entails all other positive values, such as liberty and justice,
then pursuit of equality necessarily advances the cause of
liberty and justice. Thus, we can, with no sense of irony, censor
speech in the name of free speech.33
30. Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty, in ISAIAH BERLIN, FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 122, 167 (1969).
31. Ik
32. See Kingsley R. Browne, Liberty vs. Equality: Congressional En-
forcement Power Under the Fourth Amendment, 59 DENV. L.J. 417, 434-
40 (1982).
33. Just as Professor Sangree urges that speech be suppressed in the
name of free speech, the Federal Aviation Administration apparently
believes that sexual harassment should be engaged in to suppress sexual
harassment. See Male Air Traffic Controller Alleges Sexual Harassment in
"Reverse Tailhook," DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), Sept. 9, 1994, at D18 (de-
scribing a lawsuit by a male FAA employee who alleges that male em-
ployees at a cultural diversity workshop were forced to run a "gauntlet"
of female employees who fondled the male employees; female participants
later used charts depicting penises in varying states of arousal to de-
scribe the men in the exercise). The purpose of the exercise, according to
the professional organizer of the workshop, was to jar male participants
into understanding what women face in the workplace. Jean Marbella,
Diversity Training Is Raising Issues Along With Consciousness, BALTI-
588 [Vol.47:579
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Contrary to Professor Sangree's view, free speech and equal-
ity are not always, and perhaps not even usually, fully compat-
ible. For example, a statute guaranteeing a right of reply to
political candidates who are attacked by a newspaper is easily
justified in terms of equality, as is a limitation on expenditures
in political campaigns. Had the Supreme Court accepted Pro-
fessor Sangree's reasoning, it would have viewed such statutes
as furthering First Amendment interests; instead, it held that
they violated the First Amendment.34 Similarly, speech advo-
cating the violent overthrow of the government does not "fur-
ther the underlying democratic aims of the First Amendment,"
but the state may not prohibit such speech unless it is an in-
citement to imminent lawless conduct. 35
V. PROFESSOR SANGREE OBSCURES THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN
SPEECH AND CONDUCT
According to Professor Sangree, the argument that hostile-
environment harassment regulation is unconstitutional neces-
sarily implies that all of discrimination law is unconstitutional
as well.36 She states that discrimination "always carries a po-
litical message, usually it concerns men's domination of wom-
en."'37 Since discrimination carries a message, she reasons, a
law that prohibits messages is equivalent, for First Amend-
ment purposes, to a law that prohibits discrimination.' If the
MORE SUN, Oct. 9, 1994, at 1D.
34. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); Miami Herald Publishing
Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
35. Sangree, supra note 1, at 527.
36. Id. at 465.
37. Id. at 521.
38. Professor Sangree repeatedly labels the speech at issue in hostile-
environment cases "coercive," apparently to bring its regulation under
precedents such as NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969),
that have allowed regulation of coercive speech. Professor Sangree, how-
ever, never says what the speech coerces. In one place she refers to
coercion to submit to gender discrimination and in another she seems to
refer to coercion to endure the speech. Sangree, supra note 1, at 513.
Labeling speech "coercive" on that ground begs the question. In contrast,
in Gissel, the threatening speech risked coercing employees into voting
against a union; in extortion cases, the coercion may involve paying mon-
ey; in quid pro quo cases, sex may be coerced. It is the forced transac-
1995] 589
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latter is permissible, so must be the former.
Professor Sangree does not explore the full ramifications of
her argument, which ultimately is either a profoundly anti-
speech position or a profoundly libertarian one. Her argument
of equivalence implies that all laws are subject to First Amend-
ment analysis or none of them are. Presumably, the ordinary
motorist defending a speeding ticket may assert a First
Amendment defense, and it is simply up to the court to bal-
ance the importance of regulating speeding against the
motorist's expressive interests and to come up with its answer.
By the same token, we might conclude that a law prohibiting
assassination of the President regulates expression, since polit-
ical assassination carries with it a message of severe criticism.
Nonetheless, we have no trouble distinguishing between laws
prohibiting assassination and laws prohibiting criticism of the
President. Yet Professor Sangree's argument would imply that
if political assassination can be regulated, so can political criti-
cism.
The distinction that seems to give Professor Sangree the
most trouble is that between quid pro quo harassment and
hostile-environment harassment, a distinction that is well-
recognized in the law. She asserts that Professor Volokh and I
"artificially distinguish" between the two forms of harass-
ment,39 and argues that the two forms cannot be distin-
guished on the basis that quid pro quo harassment entails
threats. The example she gives to illustrate her point is a su-
pervisor who requests sex from a subordinate and then after
being rejected retaliates against her with an adverse employ-
ment action." In such circumstances, she argues, there is no
threat, but a quid pro quo action would nonetheless exist. Her
conclusion is correct, but not because quid pro quo actions
regulate speech. What Professor Sangree fails to appreciate is
that in her example it is not the request for sex-which is
expression-that violates Title VII; it is the retaliatory em-
ployment action-which is not expression. Professor Sangree
similarly confuses the issue when she asserts that Title VII is
tion that renders the speech unprotected, not the fact that the listeners
do not want to hear it.
39. Sangree, supra note 1, at 511.
40. I at 512.
590 [Vol.47:579
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violated when an employer "denies a woman a job by telling
her 'Sorry, we are only hiring men.' "", Contrary to her view,
it is not the message that violates Title VII; it is the refusal to
hire.42 If the refusal to hire is based upon sex, the law is vio-
lated no matter what the employer says or does not say.
Professor Sangree's failure to appreciate the essential dis-
tinction between speech and conduct is similarly reflected in
her reliance on Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission
on Human Relations,43 a case she asserts most closely pres-
ents the issue "whether hostile environment law is a valid
incidental regulation of speech."" In Pittsburgh Press, the
Court examined a city ordinance that prohibited newspapers
from carrying "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated
columns in circumstances where it would be unlawful for the
employer to restrict the position to a single sex. The Court,
relying upon the fact that commercial speech receives less
protection under the First Amendment and the illegality of the
transactions, upheld the restriction. The Court reasoned that
the restriction was on the same footing as a prohibition of
advertisements proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting pros-
titutes.4 5
The Court, unlike Professor Sangree, recognized a difference
between speech that facilitates discriminatory conduct and
speech that merely expresses prejudiced views. It distinguished
the allegedly libelous advertisement at issue in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan," which "communicated information,
expressed opinion, recited grievances, [and] protested claimed
abuses," from advertisements for illegal commercial activity."
The Court emphasized that none of the want ads "expresses a
position on whether, as a matter of social policy, certain posi-
41. Id. at 522.
42. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1988) (making it an unlawful employ-
ment practice "to fail or refuse to hire . . . any individual . . . because
of such individual's . . . sex").
43. 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
44. Sangree, supra note 1, at 526.
45. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 388.
46. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47. Pittsburgh Press, 413 U.S. at 385 (quoting Sullivan, 376 U.S. at
266).
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tions ought to be filled by members of one or the other sex '
and that "nothing in [its] holding allows government at any
level to forbid Pittsburgh Press to publish and distribute ad-
vertisements commenting on the Ordinance, the enforcement
practices of the Commission, or the propriety of sex preferences
in employment.
49
The distinction observed by the Court in Pittsburgh Press be-
tween expressing views and illegally acting on them is one that
neither Professor Sangree nor lower courts have observed in
hostile-environment cases.5" Consider the example that Pro-
fessor Sangree gives of the female employee overhearing her
supervisor commenting that he believes that women should
stay home and take care of their children and that their failure
to do so has resulted in various social ills.5 The statement
was apparently not directed toward the female employee, but
she felt "personally attacked" by the comments. According to
48. Id.
49. Id. at 391. Professor Sangree asserts, supra note 1, at 505 n.188,
that the Supreme Court in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538
(1992), rejected the argument that hostile-environment regulation violates
the First Amendment. Even taking the R.A V. dictum at face value, she
reads too much into it. In the first place, the Court said that "a particu-
lar content-based subcategory of a proscribable class of speech can be
swept up incidentally within the reach of a statute directed at conduct
rather than speech." Id. at 2546 (emphasis added). Therefore, for the
dictum to apply, the speech at issue would have to fall into one of the
categories of otherwise proscribable speech, such as fighting words or
obscenity. The bulk of the speech at issue in hostile-environment cases
does not fall into these categories. Browne, supra note 2, at 526-29. In
the second place, whether or not some of the speech involved in a given
case is potentially regulable, the vagueness problems previously discussed
still remain.
50. The distinction that Professor Sangree finds so illusory between
prohibiting the expression of bigoted views and engaging in bigoted ac-
tions is one that the Supreme Court has had less trouble with. Compare
R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2541 (unanimously holding unconstitutional a city
ordinance defining as disorderly conduct the display of a symbol "which
one knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or
gender") with Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993) (unanimously
upholding a state law enhancing a criminal sentence if the victim was
selected because of race or other proscribed basis).
51. Sangree, supra note 1, at 548.
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Professor Sangree, these statements "place one more formida-
ble barrier in front of women seeking to prosper in a male
dominated world"52 and therefore are barred by Title VII:
"Once Joe is notified that such statements are unwelcome to
Alice, he must refrain from saying them so that she will not
hear--despite Joe's belief in political theory."' This is pure
political speech, yet Professor Sangree would censor it in the
name of free speech. 4
VI. PROFESSOR SANGREE OVERSTATES THE DEGREE TO WHICH
SPEECH REGULATION Is NECESSARY
Professor Sangree criticizes Professor Volokh and me for
focusing on particular facts of cases without discussing the
entirety of the circumstances presented in each case." I ex-
plained in my article why that was appropriate: a judgment
that rests even in part on protected speech is constitutionally
invalid.56 Thus, the issue is not whether all of the speech for
which liability was imposed was constitutionally protected, but
rather whether any of it was.57
By way of demonstrating the inappropriateness of focusing
on isolated facts, Professor Sangree points out that other facts
52. IcL at 549.
53. Id-
54. Because employers are obligated to protect their employees against
harassment from customers as well as from co-workers, presumably Pro-
fessor Sangree would require a restaurant owner to prohibit 'customers
from discussing books dealing with racial differences in intelligence, see
RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE: INTELLI-
GENCE AND CLASS STRUCTURE IN AMERICAN LIFE (1994), or sex differenc-
es in the brain, see ROBERT POOL, EVE'S RIB: SEARCHING FOR THE BIO-
LOGICAL ROOTS OF SEX DIFFERENCES (1994), in front of black or female
employees.
55. Sangree, supra note 1, at 475 n.59.
56. See NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 922-23
(1982).
57. Had I found cases as stark as the case of Joe and Alice, see
Sangree, supra note 1, at 548-50, my description of how hostile-environ-
ment regulation suppresses political speech could have been much short-
er. See Browne, supra note 2, at 491-501. I could have simply described
the facts of the case and declared "Q.E.D." I hope that no court would
accept Professor Sangree's argument that Title VII is violated if Joe
expresses his views one more time within earshot of Alice.
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in the cases demonstrate the egregiousness of the harassment.
For example, Professor Volokh and I were both critical of the
fact that the finding of liability in Arnold v. City of Seminole58
was based in part on statements to the effect that women
should not be police officers. 9 Professor Sangree notes that
there were many other egregious facts in the case, including
physical assaults, false -disciplinary charges, and placement of
a snake in the plaintiffs car."° In that context, she argues,
statements about the worth of women as police officers "should
clearly not be protected by the First Amendment as core politi-
cal speech." '
If the speech in Arnold was political speech, it was political
speech irrespective of what other harassment was involved. Al-
though Professor Sangree argues that a more narrow interpre-
tation of Title VII to comply with the First Amendment would
vastly undercut its purpose,"2 it is not clear why this is so. In
Arnold, as in most other serious sexual harassment cases,
there was ample unprotected conduct to support liability. Al-
lowing evidence of sexist attitudes in such cases simply invites
the trier of fact to impose liability based on a disagreement
with those attitudes, as well as sending a message to employ-
ers that they need to prevent their expression. That, of course,
is the purpose of harassment law, but it is a purpose that
conflicts with the First Amendment.
VII. CONCLUSION
As Justice Holmes observed, the impulse to censor is a natu-
ral one: "If you have no doubt of your premises or your power
and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally
express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."'
Advocates of workplace censorship are confident in their pre-
mises, and courts have given them little reason to doubt their
power. The result has been as Holmes would have predicted.
58. 614 F. Supp. 853 (E.D. Okla. 1985).
59. IkL
60. Sangree, supra note 1, at 543.
61. Id. at 544.
62. Id. at 535.
63. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
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